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An investigation of Oliver Williamson’s 
analysis of the division of labour
Robert McMaster and Michael J. White*
In 2009 Oliver Williamson was jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for 
his analysis of economic governance. Williamson was central to the emergence of 
the transaction cost framework as an important aspect of social scientific analy-
sis. Part of this approach makes important efficiency predictions and prescriptions 
regarding the division of labour within firms in contemporary capitalist economies. 
This discounts issues of power and privileges ‘firm-specific human assets’ as the 
key organisational driver. Indeed, Williamson’s approach intentionally conflates the 
employment relation with exchanges for ‘intermediate’ goods. This article seeks 
to investigate Williamson’s explanatory claims through a UK-based panel dataset 
using a dynamic logit modelling approach. The findings question Williamson’s cen-
tral argument. The results, instead, are more consistent with the idea of the indus-
try-specificity of labour and highlight the importance of firm size.
Key words: Division of labour; Employment relation; Williamson’s transaction cost 
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1. Introduction
In 2009 Oliver E.  Williamson was jointly awarded the Bank of Sweden’s Nobel 
Memorial Prize for his analysis of organisational governance. His approach was praised 
for its emphasis on the importance of institutions in economic activity. Williamson 
(1985, 2000, 2009) is among those arguing that institutions matter because they are 
vehicles of efficiency (see also, for example, the work of fellow Nobel laureates Ronald 
Coase and Douglass North). In short, according to Williamson, the efficiency rubric of 
transaction cost minimisation determines the appropriate institutional framework, or 
governance structure, for a given exchange or transaction, including the employment 
relation (Williamson, 1985, p. 241).
Crucially, Williamson’s efficient contracting schema is driven by ‘asset specificity’; 
where assets are dedicated to and in extremis have no alternative use beyond a specific 
‘transaction’. Asset specificity generates informational asymmetries and uncertainty, 
fostering the conditions for adverse selection and moral hazard. Any disruption carries 
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efficiency consequences; hence the requirement for careful institutional design. In 
essence, Williamson’s transaction cost framework’s default position is some form of mar-
ket arrangement; ranging from simple discrete transactions to co-operative bilateral joint 
ventures. Hierarchy is seen as an organisational ‘last resort’ (Williamson, 1993, p. 131).
Williamson considers the employment relation to resemble that of any ‘intermedi-
ate good’ transaction—a central thesis of the transaction cost approach is the ubiquity 
of the ‘theory of contract’ (Williamson, 1985, p. 241). Nonetheless, in the context of 
the division or organisation of labour, Williamson identifies continuity of the relation-
ship between employer and employee as being primarily the outcome of firm-specific 
‘human assets’ and subsequently the degree of team production. For Williamson, the 
conjunction of the two factors generates a matrix from which efficient contracting 
schema can be drawn.
Williamson’s organisation of labour approach demonstrates some complementarities 
with human capital and personnel economics literatures (see, for example, Gibbons, 
2010; Lazear and Shaw, 2007). His approach is worthy of scrutiny because it makes 
predictions which augment efficiency-based views of the division and organisation of 
labour in production activities, thereby informing firms’ employment relations strate-
gies and management, and makes policy contentions that resonate with the trajectory 
of de-regulation in recent employment policy in many economies. The transaction cost 
model is highly influential in informing the strategic approaches of many firms (Cooke 
et al., 2005) and governments. For instance, Williamson’s framework ‘demonstrates’ 
the efficiency properties of de-regulated flexible labour markets in situations where 
work is of a temporary or seasonal nature, and accordingly trade unions have little or 
no justifiable efficiency role (see also, for example, Spencer, 2009, 2011; Knox, 2010).
Any empirical analysis of this area of the transaction cost approach is beset with 
complications and significant challenges. Indeed, Williamson (1985, p.  389) grants 
that the transaction cost framework is not readily amenable to ‘conventional’ empiri-
cal techniques. He considers the framework to be empirically ‘crude’ and recognises 
that ‘measurement problems are severe’ and models are ‘primitive’ (see also David and 
Han, 2004; North and Wallis, 1994). Nonetheless, Williamson has claimed on several 
occasions that transaction cost economics (TCE) ‘is an empirical success story’ (for 
example, 1999, p. 1092, and 2000, p. 605). There have been a host of empirical exami-
nations of TCE’s governance predictions, with prominent authors, such as Carroll and 
Teece (1999, p. 3) arguing that TCE is, ‘perhaps the single most influential theory 
in the social sciences’. However, in important survey articles, Carter and Hodgson 
(2006) and David and Han (2004) convincingly argue that the empirical evidence is 
not as clear-cut as Williamson (and others) suggest. Much of this literature concen-
trates on Williamson’s central governance claims—the make or buy decision—with 
little explicit scrutiny of his predictions for the division of labour (for exceptions, see 
Barton et  al., 1999; Battu et  al., 2002). This article seeks to contribute to address-
ing this shortfall in empirical scrutiny, although it is recognised that the analysis is 
only partial and, due to data limitations and measurability issues, proxy measures are 
applied, which can never be entirely precise (indeed, this is a feature of the litera-
ture, see for example, David and Han, 2004; Carter and Hodgson, 2006). Much of 
the literature relating to the organisation and division of labour obtains data centred 
on the firm, or samples of firms (see for example, Baker et al., 1994; Bloom and van 
Reenen, 2007; Slaughter et  al., 2007). By contrast, the approach adopted here uti-
lises a household panel data set—the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This 
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approach, we believe, enhances the scope of the type of organisational arrangements 
that can be incorporated into the study. Williamson’s analysis is cross-sectional, and 
to the best of our knowledge, this is reflected in the empirical literature. However, 
although Williamson (2000) readily acknowledges that TCE is static, in the context 
of the employment relation he recognises a dynamic dimension to the acquisition of 
‘specific’ skills (for example, Williamson, 1985, pp. 242–43 and p. 246). Accordingly, 
we develop a dynamic model that traces the sensitivity of firm-specific labour skills to 
‘on-the-job training’. This, we feel, is the first time that Williamson’s analysis of the 
division of labour has been subject to such an examination.1 Thus, our study is an 
attempt to augment those firm/industry-based qualitative and quantitative approaches 
by offering an additional source of evidence.
The next section concisely sets out Williamson’s analysis of the division of labour 
and notes some general criticisms of his approach. Following this, the difficulties in 
testing Williamson’s propositions are detailed, the empirical approach and findings are 
then presented. Conclusions follow.
2. Dividing and organising labour according to Williamson
The concept of asset specificity within the context of the labour market is clearly not 
new—arguably dating back at least to Adam Smith’s study of the division of labour. 
Asset specificity may be a particular manifestation of specialisation—in the case of 
the division of labour, leading to specific skills. The division of labour was, in Smith’s 
view, a significant development in socio-economic progress through its uplift of labour 
productivity. Following Smith, Karl Marx argued the division of labour was both a 
source of material benefit and a disciplinary mechanism. As political economy gave 
way to ‘economic science’, prompting the demarcation between economics and soci-
ology in the mid- to late twentieth century, the efficiency rationale for the division 
of labour almost completely crowded out the power argument, certainly in econom-
ics. Moreover, the underpinning philosophy changed from a eudaemonic orienta-
tion—where well-being is conceived of as an active process of flourishing that crucially 
involves social interaction—to the hedonic, centred on preference fulfilment (Lopes, 
2011). In other words, the notion of ‘work’ and flourishing gave way to ‘labour’ and 
disutility (see also Spencer, 2000, 2009, 2011; Fleetwood, 2011)
Indeed, the standard economic emphasis is evident in Williamson’s work. In Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism (1985) he privileges the efficiency argument by devoting a 
chapter to critiquing what he calls the ‘radical economic’ (1985, p. 207) arguments 
of, for example, Stephen Marglin. Williamson assumes the social embeddedness, or 
institutional environment and hence the eudaemonic, of the employment relation is of 
limited importance. He treats it as a ‘set of shift parameters’ presumed to be constant 
and subservient to transaction cost economising (Williamson, 1993, 2000, 2009).
2.1 Williamson’s three pillars
Williamson employs two major behavioural assumptions: bounded rationality and 
opportunism. The former is drawn from Herbert Simon’s (1997 [1947]) Administrative 
Behavior and is taken to mean that agents are intendedly rational, but limitedly so 
1 We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee who effectively prompted us to further interrogate 
the dynamic properties of Williamson’s analysis of the division of labour.
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(Williamson, 1985, p. 45). In other words, agents are cognitively limited and therefore 
not always capable of making optimal decisions. Simon’s original usage related to knowl-
edge limitations in their various dimensions, so that, for example, even if an individual 
is in possession of all the relevant information he or she may lack the capability and skill 
to make an appropriate decision due to, for instance, a lack of experience. Williamson’s 
approach is closer to the information asymmetries emphasis of standard economics.
For Williamson (1985, p. 47), opportunism is ‘self-interest seeking with guile’. This 
embodies an extensive range of behaviours, including: fraud, deceit, cheating, steal-
ing and other forms of dishonesty. It is also, at least, captured in standard economic 
references to adverse selection and moral hazard. In his TCE framework opportunism 
and bounded rationality only become problematic, in efficiency terms, following the 
specificity of human and capital assets.
In the employment relation, Williamson’s approach emphasises the incomplete-
ness of contracts, because bounded rationality precludes the ex ante specification of 
potential contingencies. Consequently, the risk of transaction-disrupting opportun-
ism is increased. This opportunistic potential is determined by the degree of ‘asset 
specificity’. More sophisticated governance arrangements are required to attenuate 
the threat of opportunism, and, hence, maintain contractual continuity and effi-
ciency. In the employment relation authority discretion (power) is ceded by employ-
ees in return for a reduction in uncertainty over job property rights, such as wages 
and conditions (Williamson, 1975; Williamson et  al., 1975). This, for Williamson, 
is the essence of governance—the extent of embedded job property rights and the 
continuity of the employment relation is determined by the degree of firm-specific 
human capital.
According to Williamson (1985, pp. 242–43) this provides explanatory advantages:
Whereas neoclassical reasoning links skills to productivity and compensation, transaction cost 
reasoning introduces organizational considerations. Specifically, skills that are acquired in a 
learning-by-doing fashion and that are imperfectly transferable across employers have to be 
embedded in a protective governance structure lest productive values be sacrificed if the employ-
ment relation is unwittingly severed. (emphasis in original)
However, Williamson is not always consistently clear on asset specificity (see also 
David and Han, 2004). It is frequently portrayed as exogenous to the transaction in his 
analysis; yet whilst he argues for the ubiquity of his framework in comparing employ-
ment contracts with those for intermediate goods, he also appears to recognise that 
firm-specific employment can be facilitated and induced by the contract, that is, it is 
endogenous, as his allusion to ‘learning-by-doing’ seems to indicate. He also notes the 
‘deepening’ of skills, such as those of a physician or a typist, can occur with experi-
ence (and tenure) but may be transferable and therefore pose little risk to transaction 
cost inflation. However, ‘knowledge of a particular firm’s filing system . . . may be 
highly specific’ and therefore does pose a governance issue. Yet this knowledge is surely 
acquired over time and fostered by a particular employment relation. Indeed, as the 
examples demonstrate, Williamson’s use of the rather ponderous phrase ‘human asset 
specificity’ lacks definitional precision. The term may refer to specific investment or 
skills, but also particular knowledge—tacit and overt. Yet Williamson does not identify 
‘knowledge’ as an important concept; there is sparse, if any, explicit discussion of the 
complexities of knowledge, and the notion is conspicuous by its absence from the 
index of Economic Institutions of Capitalism.
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2.2 The efficient contract matrix
Williamson (1985, p. 242) does, however, concede that the employment relation differs 
in one aspect from ‘other’ intermediate transactions; the former occurs on an ongoing 
basis. The main implication of this is that governance choice in non-labour ‘intermedi-
ate goods transactions’ is primarily driven by the degree of asset specificity and subse-
quently by the frequency with which transactions occur. For the employment relation, 
again the efficient division of labour is primarily driven by ‘human asset specificity’ and 
secondarily by the separability of working relations, which keys into the measurability 
of a particular worker’s effort, productivity and performance. Nonetheless, the clear 
driver remains asset specificity, which forms the centrepiece of Williamson’s ubiquity 
claim for his framework.
Williamson is interested in the process by which a ‘large numbers’ situation is trans-
ferred into a ‘small numbers’ one, that is, where many potential transacting parties 
diminish to a few, ultimately a bilateral monopoly. He argues that when workers pos-
sess firm-specific skills, and the task is non-separable, a small numbers situation arises 
because those skills are not transferable. This implies potentially significant uncer-
tainty for the firm. In the event of contract termination, the firm would experience 
difficulty in replacing the worker. Hence, workers may exploit their position oppor-
tunistically by appropriating an ‘undue share’ of benefits in efficiency terms. However, 
because workers’ skills are non-tradable they face considerable uncertainty and immo-
bility. Williamson maintains that transactions of this type can only occur under protec-
tive governance structures, which ensure job property rights, and a highly structured 
internal labour market with promotion opportunities, low entry ports, and on-the-job 
training. Moreover, such governance arrangements bond the parties together through 
credible commitments and provide a focus for mutual orientation.
Furthermore, the TCE framework ascribes a transaction cost economising role to 
trade unions in two ways. First, collective bargaining avoids the potentially transaction 
costly method of bargaining on an individual basis. In this way, Williamson et al. (1975, 
p. 270) claim individual opportunistic bargaining is avoided, and more general organi-
sational objectives are elevated above individual ones. Second, by providing a voice 
mechanism unions avoid the transaction-disrupting potential of disgruntled workers 
leaving the firm. Given this, the framework predicts that efficiency-enhancing unions 
will arise early in those industries and firms where human capital is durable, such as 
‘railroads’, and late, if at all, in occupations with non-specific assets (Williamson, 1985, 
p. 256).
According to his matrix, determined by the binary interaction of firm specific labour 
and separable work relations, four simplified classes of the efficient division of labour 
may be articulated as in Table 1.
As noted, the internal spot market is typified by a lack of ‘efficiency interest’ in main-
taining the employment relation when either party is dissatisfied with the prospect 
of continuing their association. Workers can exercise mobility without any productive 
loss and firms find it easy to find replacements without incurring any significant costs. 
A  large numbers situation pertains in such cases, and the firm can easily measure 
worker productivity to ensure the absence of ‘shirking’. Williamson portrays a sce-
nario of equal empowerment, but this critically assumes at least a reasonably buoyant 
labour market with plentiful alternative sources of employment, inferring the efficiency 
requirement for unsophisticated safeguards or governance arrangements. A relatively 
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high turnover of staff may be seen as insignificant. In general, many unskilled or gener-
ically skilled positions would resonate.
The ‘obligational market’ is typified by the ease of monitoring and, ‘firm-specific 
learning . . . [and] idiosyncratic organizational experience’ (1985, p.  246, emphasis 
added), such as procedural conventions, complex rules and data processing. Here both 
firms and workers make an investment in specific skills and consequently have a vested 
interest in maintaining their relationship. Hence Williamson alludes to safeguards, 
such as severance pay and other benefits to employees to diminish the possibility of 
departure. This type of arrangement would then be apposite for skilled and highly 
skilled occupations.
For Williamson, the ‘primitive team’ arrangement is efficient in circumstances 
where individual remuneration cannot be easily determined by virtue of team-based 
production arrangements. Efficient governance arrangements call for some supervi-
sory arrangement, such as the Indian jamadar, who enlists and supervises construc-
tion workers for firms (Williamson, 1985, p. 246). More generally, ‘the coupling of 
employment with an oversight assignment is involved’ (ibid.). Again, due to the lack of 
firm-specific skills (and knowledge) and skills generally, a high staff turnover could be 
tolerated, and relatively high absenteeism rates would presumably not be considered 
significantly problematic in transaction cost terms (see also Knox’s 2010 study of the 
Australian hotel industry).
The ‘relational team’ represents the greatest form of investment in firm-specific 
skills coupled with extensive difficulties in assessing the contribution of each individual 
employee. Here, as noted, both employer and employee have considerable interest 
in maintaining the continuity of their association. Accordingly, Williamson consid-
ers that firms should engage in processes of aligning interests and incentives between 
the firm and this type of workforce. Here he predicts high degrees of ‘social condi-
tioning’ coupled with considerable job security and other benefits, such as medical 
insurance, which may be ‘fiercely egalitarian’, to encourage a high degree of employee 
loyalty. Importantly, this suggests that employees in such positions will perceive exten-
sive job security. Williamson draws on Ouchi’s (1980) ‘clan’ organisation to invoke 
Table 1. Williamson’s efficient division of labour
Low asset specificity High asset specificity
Separable work relations Internal spot market 
(possible examples: 
migrant farm workers; 
custodial employees; some 
professionals—certain 
draftsmen and engineers; 
cleaners)
Obligational market  
(possible examples: 
administrative support staff; 
some professions—such as 
some types  
of legal practice)
Non-separable work relations Primitive team (possible 
examples: some forms  
of labouring, such as  
manual freight loading; 
construction work)
Relational team  
(possible examples:  
information technology;  
high-technology activities)
Notes: Possible examples are not drawn from Williamson directly; he offers little if any direct examples in 
those categories. Rather, ‘possible examples’ are inferred from his rationale.
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1985, p. 247).
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the co-operation and team spirit associated with the relational team. Also, as a result, 
Williamson anticipates lower resistance to technological innovations and lower absen-
teeism rates than other forms of labour division.
To elaborate on the logic of Williamson’s argument, imagine that if a worker is an 
important part of a team, such that team performance would be adversely affected 
(at least in the short term) by the worker’s absence or under-performance, then it 
would be expected that the worker would perceive his or her position to be relatively 
secure. This argument has an important bearing in the development of the empirical 
approach, which is elaborated later.
2.3 Some conceptual criticisms
Williamson’s model has been subject to some sustained criticism (see, for example, 
Dow, 1987; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 2004; Kay, 1992).2 Of particular 
significance is Dow’s (1987) criticism. He contests that Williamson applies oppor-
tunism between employer and employee asymmetrically: Williamson tends to focus 
on the potential opportunistic traits in the latter to the exclusion of the former. This 
echoes a more general criticism of mainstream labour economics regarding its relega-
tion of power (see, for example, Spencer, 2009), and its disutility of work assumption. 
Simon (1991), for example, poses the question: if work is such a source of disutility, 
then why are more instances of free-riding and shirking not observed? He contests 
that workers demonstrate docility and acceptance of authority (see also, for example, 
Spencer, 2009; Fleetwood, 2011; Lopes, 2011). Also of some relevance is the sensi-
tivity of Williamson’s efficiency predictions to his ubiquity of opportunism assump-
tion. Recent work highlighting social capital in the workplace (for example, Rafael and 
Zemsky, 2002) acts as a potential platform for a conceptual challenge to the privileging 
of opportunism.
There are also theoretical questions over Williamson’s allusion to specificity. The 
transaction cost framework tacitly assumes asset specificity is exogenously determined; 
yet Williamson explicitly recognises this is not the case with ongoing employment 
contracts. Nonetheless, his emphasis remains on asset specificity’s ‘locomotive role’ 
in determining governance arrangements. As noted, this is problematic: experiential 
knowledge idiosyncrasies develop with duration, and skill enhancement would tend to 
result in more sophisticated contractual relations (for example, Slaughter et al., 2007). 
Reward structures, fringe benefits, pension rights and promotion prospects may all be 
associated with skill progression and, indeed, may exhibit important feedback proper-
ties. For example, generous reward structures and promotion prospects may encour-
age employee lock-in with a firm, and thereby foster the development of firm-specific 
skills—the opposite causal flow predicted by Williamson. Indeed, he states nothing 
overtly about wages; predictions are inferred. Herein lies a tension in Williamson’s anal-
ysis. As noted, his TCE framework is explicitly static (for example, Williamson, 2000), 
but the admission of the acquisition of specific skills over time suggests endogeneity 
2 Williamson has been accused of lacking clarity in a host of significant concepts within transaction cost 
theory, ranging from ‘contract’, ‘transaction’, ‘institution’, ‘economising on bounded rationality’ and ‘oppor-
tunism’ (see, for example, Dow, 1987; Kay, 1992; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 2004). Some con-
cepts—such as ‘institutions’—are not defined by Williamson; others are only very loosely defined and lack 
conceptual clarity.
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and a dynamic model. This represents a particular empirical challenge, which we out-
line in Section 3.
Second, communication and informal group idiosyncrasies are to be found in most 
jobs, but many procedures tend not to be firm-specific but industry-specific (Jacoby, 
1990, p. 323). There are numerous examples of industry standards and professional 
associations that seek to both establish and disseminate best practices and common 
practices, procedures and protocols in a particular industry or professional activity 
rather than a specific organisation. Thus, for example, the rise of evidence-based medi-
cine has introduced particular practices and protocols in medical practise that is not 
specific to any particular firm or organisation, but is to medicine (see for example, 
McMaster, 2008). According to Jacoby’s perspective, workers—even those with highly 
specialised skills—will be more mobile than Williamson’s model predicts. Therefore, 
industry-specific skills may be of more significance than Williamson’s framework sug-
gests, as more sophisticated contractual arrangements may also arise through the 
potential of employee exit threats to other firms in an industry where skills are indus-
try-specific. Thus, using Williamson’s schema (Table  1), pace Williamson, relational 
team type contracts may appeal to firms wishing to commit their employees who pos-
sess industry-specific skills. The importance of this is that there is an alternative narra-
tive account to that presented by Williamson.
Williamson’s analysis does not consider any potential impact on ‘efficient govern-
ance’ that may arise from firm size. Prima facie, this may be unproblematic, but if 
size has any bearing on the ‘separability of work relations’ and factors influencing the 
degree of firm-specific labour, then this may be an oversight in Williamson’s approach. 
We analyse this in Section 3.
3. Empirical analysis
Williamson offers a blueprint for the efficient division of labour that complements 
important aspects of the standard economic approach to this issue; it also resonates 
with important policy initiatives relating to, for instance, attempts to increase the flex-
ibility of labour markets, by, say, constraining the influence of trade unions. According 
to Williamson’s rubric, unions offer limited efficiency advantages in those activities 
where workers do not possess firm-specific skills, and such activities should not be sub-
ject to what he views as unnecessary ‘protective governance structures’, arguably what 
may be perceived as workers’ rights. More generally, as noted, Williamson’s default 
position is for arrangements that ensure that ‘resources are allocated to their high-
est value as the marvel of the market works its wonders’ (2000, p. 598), unless asset 
specificity prompts some other organisational arrangements. Moreover, for Williamson 
(1985), the labour market is equivalent to that of any ‘intermediate good’.
The model we present next endeavours to explore the extent to which Williamson’s 
explanation resembles the structure of employment practices in a developed Western 
economy, the United Kingdom. Our modelling approach reflects Williamson’s explicit 
acknowledgement of the dynamic (and endogenous) sources of firm-specific labour, 
noted earlier. To the best of our knowledge, this is by no means a standard approach 
to empirically testing TCE, in general, and his division of labour analysis, in particular. 
For instance, Carter and Hodgson’s (2006) and David and Han’s (2004) meta-analyses 
indicate that almost all prominent empirical studies in this area appear to be cross-sec-
tional. Our approach is founded on a dynamic procedure that relates firm-specific labour 
 at N
ottingham
 Trent U
niversity on June 21, 2013
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Williamson’s analysis of the division of labour  Page 9 of 19
skills (as proxied by tenure) to on-the-job training. Specifically, we interact the relevant 
variables in a logit regression over the time period of the entire data set (from 1991 to 
2006) controlling for all other characteristics (i.e., all other variables in our model).
3.1 Data
The BHPS panel dataset was used. This tracks household and individual histories 
over time. Its first wave occurred in 1991, and the survey has been updated each year. 
The sample, for various reasons, changes over time. The panel, however, permits an 
examination of labour market changes over time, career progression, unemployment 
propensity, and skill acquisition, all of which are relevant to this study. We discontin-
ued our analysis at 2006 as a means of obviating the potential impact of the 2007 (and 
ongoing) financial crisis.
The dataset offers the advantages of large sample size: 63,420 in this study. As noted, 
much of the literature examining the organisation of labour tends to be firm-based, and 
as such the BHPS offers less detailed coverage of employment activities. However, due 
to its panel nature it offers an enhanced coverage of organisational arrangements and 
an extensive range of occupations that can be incorporated into the study. Moreover, it 
enables individuals and employment arrangements to be tracked over time, affording 
a dynamic dimension. Thus, the data offer the opportunity to obtain a richer milieu 
of organisational structures and their development than single firm/industry studies.
3.2 Measurement and other empirical approaches
As noted, there are extensive measurement challenges in this area (Williamson, 1985; 
David and Han, 2004). In their surveys of the empirical analysis of TCE, Carter and 
Hodgson (2006) and David and Han (2004) note the lack of consensus in defin-
ing variables. Earlier, Farber (1999, p.  2468) argued, ‘specific capital is not gener-
ally directly measurable or even observable’, hence the use of proxies is common. 
Indeed, David and Han refer to nine potential ways of capturing labour asset speci-
ficity, including specialised skills, training needs and buyer loyalty. In this study two 
key areas are highlighted: asset specificity and employment contract features. Here 
labour specificity is proxied by tenure. Tenure is given by the time (in months) that the 
respondent has been employed in his or her current job. The use of tenure as a proxy 
for labour specificity has precedence in the human resource management and labour 
economics literatures (for example, Cavanagh and Garen, 1997; Farber, 1999; Bingley 
and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Farber (1999, p.  2468) considers such arguments 
to be reasoning by analogy, where ‘the idea is that if time in the labor market indexes 
accumulation of general skills then time with the firm indexes accumulation of firm-
specific skills’. This may also resonate with Williamson’s (1985, p. 246) references to 
firm-specific learning in his ‘obligational market’ category.
In this context the application of the tenure-specificity analogy is subject to three 
potentially significant constraints (Farber, 1999). First, standard human capital mod-
els suggest a non-linear relationship between tenure and earnings. Second, tenure may 
be influential in wage determination processes, such that long-serving employees may 
be treated differently from other employees in that tenure premiums may be evident, 
which implies the following. Third, wage levels do not reflect productivity, and exten-
sive specialisation may engender a bilateral monopoly. Hence, as Farber argues, it is 
arbitrary to assign wage as a dependent variable with tenure as an explanatory variable.
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In this study we believe the latter two of Farber’s limitations are avoided, as 
Williamson’s model makes no explicit predictions of earnings in transactions typified 
by asset specificity; the empirical model is not predicated on any particular pattern 
in any tenure-earnings profile. The first difficulty (concavity of tenure returns) is of 
a greater significance, however, but it is not entirely straightforward to address. For 
instance, the potential for a concave function could just as easily be disputed in terms 
of the definitions used to measure benefit flows and productivity. Longer tenured 
employees may have acquired considerable tacit knowledge that contributes to their 
performance in ways not directly amenable to measurement. Thus, the concavity effect 
may be of diminished importance in the context of this exercise (Battu et al., 2002).
Other studies, for example, Slaughter et al. (2007) measure skills specificity through 
defining job categories and eliciting the views of a panel of ‘experts’ on the uniqueness 
of skills to that category within a firm. This obviously offers a considerable advantage 
as it escapes some of the deficiencies associated with the use of tenure as a proxy. 
However, Slaughter et al.’s dataset is firm-based and dedicated to a specific industry 
and location (information technology in Singapore). By employing household panel 
data, the approach presented here is more amenable to accommodating Williamson’s 
matrix, which obviously extends beyond a single industry.
3.3 The model
Given the ambiguities of aspects of Williamson’s approach and the problems identi-
fied earlier in articulating empirical analysis, a model based on, but not replicating, 
the matrix identified in Table 1 is developed. Independent variables relate to job secu-
rity; contractual characteristics, including the status of the job (full-time, permanent, 
part-time, temporary), period of notice, pension and wage arrangements, holiday enti-
tlements; worker characteristics, including education and marital status; industry cat-
egories; wage levels; and job characteristics, including trade union membership. We 
also note firm size as measured by the number of employees (where a small firm is 
defined as: 1–24 employees; medium is 25–99, and large is equal to or greater than 100 
employees). Drawing from Williamson, we set the dependent variables as tenure and 
perceptions of job security. The latter acts as a proxy in reflecting his argument that 
both parties will be bound by their relationship the greater the extent of specific invest-
ment involved. The dataset did not possess a variable matching Williamson’s allusion to 
work separability, and potential proxies, revolving around job autonomy, such as ‘being 
your own boss’ and ‘greater initiative’ could not be applied because there were too few 
responses to these questions making the sample size for those who responded (less than 
0.3% of the total sample), insufficient for statistical analysis. Interestingly, most who 
did answer said this had attracted them to the job in question. Moreover, there are no 
variables in BHPS that relate to remuneration being partly based on a collective or team 
effort/performance. The use of job security is thus based on, as noted earlier, what we 
believe to be an intuitively appealing argument that resonates strongly with the tenor of 
Williamson’s TCE analysis. Those individual workers who constitute an important part 
of a team, by virtue of their absence or under-performance having a potentially delete-
rious impact on the overall performance of the team, would perceive themselves to be 
relatively secure in their position. This is not an entirely satisfactory assumption, espe-
cially as such perceptions would be affected by the macro-performance of the economy, 
but given the nature of the data we are not aware of variables that offer an enhanced 
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representation. Nonetheless, as noted, we have endeavoured to address the potential 
impact of recent economic events by using data up to and including 2006.
A simultaneous equations model where both dependent variables are binary was 
employed. This permits a direct test of whether simultaneity exists between variables 
(Greene, 2000), in this case between job security and asset specificity. The binary vari-
ables are formally expressed:
 y y1 11 0 0= >
∗ if   otherwise,  
 y y2 21 0 0= >
∗ if   otherwise,  (1)
The variable y1 reflects aspects of job security captured via a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if an individual perceives his or her job is secure. Asset specificity 
(y2) is captured by tenure in a specific employment, also a dummy variable taking 
a value of 0 if tenure is less than or equal to 48 months and 1 if tenure is greater 
than 48 months.3 This is no random figure. Williamson (1985, p. 270) uses this as a 
distinction between long-term and sequential short-term contracts in his discussion 
of franchising. As emphasised, Williamson assumes that labour contracting and the 
exchange of intermediate outputs are substantially the same. Given this, we see no rea-
son, stemming from his analysis, to preclude the use of this measure. In his discussion 
of employment, Williamson does not refer to any specific measures, he merely stresses 
contractual continuity. It seems to us that the specification of four years as a proxy 
measure of specificity is within the spirit of Williamson’s use of the term ‘continuity’.
A two-stage procedure may be used to correct for simultaneity. In the first stage per-
ceptions of job security may be predicted from a reduced-form logit that includes all 
variables affecting both job security perceptions and asset specificity. Asset specificity 
is also predicted from a reduced-form logit, which again includes all variables affecting 
both dependent variables. The reduced forms are expressed as:
 
y X
y X
1 1 1
2 2 2
*
*
= +
= +
β ε
β ε  (2)
where X is a vector of explanatory variables. In the second stage, the newly created 
predictor variable for job security is used in place of the original variable in the asset 
specificity (tenure) regression. Similarly, the variable predicting tenure is employed in 
the contract characteristics regression. Both the reduced forms and structural equation 
are estimated using maximum likelihood logits.
Individuals’ characteristics were captured by variables such as gender, marital status, 
age (as a proxy for experience) and the highest educational qualifications attained. 
Employment features were represented by variables including an individual’s promo-
tion prospects, trade union membership, whether they were salaried employees and 
if their job included managerial duties and had on-the-job training provided by the 
employer. Firm size and whether the firm is in the private sector were also included. 
3 We conducted a standard ordinary least-squares regression with a continuous measure for tenure as the 
dependent variable, but the model’s predictability was rendered insignificant as the tenure variable is not 
normally distributed, and repeated sampling did not produce a normal distribution.
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In addition, the potential effects of industrial and occupational grouping on both job 
security and asset specificity are controlled.
On the basis of the foregoing, we believe that Williamson’s framework would predict 
a strongly positive relationship between human capital characteristics, such as degree 
of education and experience (age), and perceptions of job security and tenure. A pos-
sible rationale being that higher levels of education suggest greater specialisation in a 
particular field. Of course, this is not necessarily the case, as education may lead to the 
enhancement of transferable skills and hence mobility. Education combined with expe-
rience and/or tenure has some resonance Williamson’s argument in that it indicates a 
degree of lock-in. A strongly positive relationship between particular occupational clas-
sifications and perceptions of job security and tenure were anticipated. Also expected, 
given Williamson’s argument, were that ‘sales and customer services’ and ‘administra-
tion and secretarial’ would have less significant relationships than ‘professional’, ‘skilled 
trades’, ‘associated professional and technical’, and ‘managerial’ to perceptions of job 
security and tenure. This reflects Williamson’s distinctions between ‘internal spot’ and 
‘relational team’ arrangements. With respect to standard industrial classifications, on the 
basis of Williamson’s matrix, ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’ and ‘construction’ would 
be expected to be negatively associated with perceptions of job security and tenure, 
given the relatively high seasonal and casual proportion of employment in these sectors. 
Williamson does not place any significance on firm size in his analysis. Accordingly, firm 
size should have no bearing on either tenure or perceptions of job security in the model.
3.4 Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the results from the logit models. The structural equations 
contain predicted values for tenure (in the job security regression) and job security (in 
the tenure regression).
The individual regressions are identified by the use of exogenous instrumental vari-
ables. In the tenure equation, age, age squared and pay incentives are used as instru-
ments. We expect that age and tenure would be related and also that financial rewards 
may strengthen tenure with a particular employer, ceteris paribus, although for reasons set 
out shortly, we do not emphasise this latter point. In the job security model, the standard 
occupational classification is employed as instrumental variables. Perceptions of job secu-
rity may reflect particular occupational characteristics and may vary across occupations.
Estimates for perceived job security are presented in Table 2. Some of the results 
reflect a priori expectations; others require further comment. There is a statistically 
insignificant relationship between job security and educational attainment at A-level 
(or equivalent) and degree level. There is an inverse relationship between basic school-
leaving qualifications, such as ‘O-levels’, and perceived job security. This latter result, 
to some extent, resonates with Williamson’s analysis. However, the statistical insignifi-
cance of higher educational attainment is not necessarily consistent with his framework, 
in which there is some expectation of security. Promotion prospects are significantly 
positively related to job security, as is being a salaried employee. From Williamson’s 
perspective, this is unsurprising and consistent with his analysis.
Having an occupational pension and being a trade union member are significantly 
inversely related to job security and is inconsistent with Williamson’s argument. 
Interestingly, being employed in the private sector is negatively related to perceived job 
security, although given Williamson’s (1985) references to bureaucracy and the public 
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sector possessing less clear-cut incentives and lower penalties for under-performance, 
this result may not have been unanticipated.
In relation to occupation classifications, most are positively related to perceived 
job security except for skilled trades classifications, which have insignificant effects. 
Table 2. Estimates for job security
Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B)
Degree is highest educational  
qualification
0.068 0.086 0.629 0.428 1.070
A-level or equivalent is highest  
educational qualification
0.046 0.087 0.285 0.593 0.955
O-level or equivalent is highest  
educational qualification
0.187 0.078 5.765 0.016 0.830
Promotion prospects 0.873 0.471 3.436 0.064 2.395
Pension 1.115 0.105 112.112 0.000 0.328
TU membership 0.751 0.093 65.517 0.000 0.472
Salaried 0.227 0.078 8.467 0.004 0.797
Managerial duties 0.077 0.069 1.242 0.265 1.080
Married .512 0.066 59.609 0.000 0.9600
Male 0.020 0.065 0.093 0.761 0.980
Private sector 0.545 0.106 26.348 0.000 0.580
Standard occupational classification
Managerial 0.590 0.130 20.553 0.000 1.804
Professional 0.677 0.137 24.491 0.000 1.969
Assoc. professional & technical 0.695 0.123 31.828 0.000 2.004
Admin & secretarial 0.502 0.127 15.672 0.000 1.653
Skilled trades 0.232 0.136 2.898 0.089 1.261
Personal service occupations 0.917 0.132 48.294 0.000 2.503
Sales & customer services 0.607 0.133 20.872 0.000 1.834
Standard industrial classification
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 1.138 0.215 27.960 0.000 3.121
Mining & manufacturing 0.864 0.169 26.075 0.000 2.373
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.709 0.198 12.794 0.000 2.032
Construction 1.012 0.167 37.398 0.000 2.750
Distribution 1.546 0.130 141.233 0.000 4.0691
Financial intermediation, business  
activities
0.820 0.157 27.422 0.000 2.270
Public admin, education 1.422 0.130 119.063 0.000 4.146
Health & social services 1.742 0.129 183.275 0.000 5.710
On-the-job training &  
medium-sized firm
0.481 0.091 28.096 0.000 1.618
On-the-job training and  
large firm
0.449 0.089 25.549 0.000 1.567
Predicted tenure 5.675 0.315 325.502 0.000 291.581
Constant 2.467 0.141 306.734 0.000 0.085
Diagnostic
Statistics
2 Log  
likelihood
Cox & Snell  
R Square
Nagelkerke R  
Square
11504.212 0.301 0.399
Wald (on instruments) Chi-square 
(7) = 27.115
P value = 0.000
Hausman-Wu (on instruments) Chi-square 
(7) = 21.289
P value = 0.000
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Again, this is not consistent with Williamson’s analysis. With ‘sales and customer ser-
vices’ and ‘administration and secretarial’ categories demonstrating significantly posi-
tive results, their coefficients are similar to those recorded for ‘managerial positions’. 
Again, this is not consistent with TCE predictions. Moreover, the insignificance of 
the ‘skilled trades’ classification, especially in the context of the significance of the 
other variables, further questions the robustness of the association of skills and secu-
rity posited by Williamson. In effect, his delineation of employment arrangements is 
questioned.
Broad industrial categories have positive effects, although the significance varies, 
with health and social services demonstrating the strongest association with perceived 
job security.
Other variables indicate that firm size interacting with on-the-job training demon-
strates a significantly positive relationship with job security, and tenure is also posi-
tively related to perceived job security. Williamson does not express an explicit view 
on firm size and perceptions of security (or worker autonomy). In terms of explaining 
this result we may speculate that workers may perceive that they have more influence 
in smaller scale production. However, this is speculation. By contrast, the tenure result 
could indicate some association with the acquisition of firm-specific skills, although 
this may also indicate seniority effects.
The results for the tenure equation are presented in Table 3. Interestingly, higher 
education exerts a negative influence on tenure. In contrast, the most basic school-leav-
ing qualification (O-levels) has a positive influence on tenure. Again, given the tenor 
of Williamson’s case, this would appear to be rather surprising. Taking his assumption 
that asset specificity is exogenously determined, given the caveats outlined previously, 
then education could potentially be a marker for those with specific skills. Yet from the 
data, there appears to be greater fluidity in graduates’ employment. As graduates seem 
also to possess a greater perception of job security relative to those with basic school-
leaving qualifications (Table 2), these results do not indicate firm specificity but may be 
suggestive of employment security and greater mobility, which is more consistent with 
Jacoby’s (1990) industry specificity analysis.
Promotion prospects are also negative but insignificant. Having a pension, being a 
salaried employee, being a trade union member and having managerial duties are all 
associated with prolonged tenure, as is being married and working in the private sec-
tor. Some of those results, excepting the private sector variable, are consistent with 
Williamson’s matrix.
Of far greater significance to the central thrust of Williamson’s thesis is the finding 
that on-the-job training reduces tenure. The significance of this result suggests that, 
pace Williamson, on-the-job training enhances workers’ general transferable skills as 
opposed to firm-specific skills, and further indicates that there are no significant lock-
in effects. Interestingly, there is a statistically significant difference between the coef-
ficients of medium and large-scaled firms, which may indicate that the extent of the 
inverse relationship between on-the-job training and tenure is greater the larger the 
scale of the firm. Again, this result is more consistent with an industry-specific expla-
nation than Williamson’s firm-specific analysis.
In terms of the interaction variable between small firms and standard occupational 
categories: ‘professional’, ‘associated professional and technical’, ‘administrative and 
secretarial’, ‘skilled trades’ and ‘personal services’ have positive and significant relation-
ships with tenure. ‘Sales and customer services’ is insignificant. Arguably, there is little 
 at N
ottingham
 Trent U
niversity on June 21, 2013
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Williamson’s analysis of the division of labour  Page 15 of 19
Table 3. Estimates for asset specificity (tenure)
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B)
Degree is highest educational  
qualification
0.742 0.089 69.150 0.000 0.476
A-level or equivalent is highest  
educational qualification
0.048 0.081 0.351 0.554 1.049
O-level or equivalent is highest  
educational qualification
0.357 0.072 24.837 0.000 1.430
Promotion prospects 1.052 0.561 3.511 0.061 0.349
Pension 1.690 0.133 161.776 0.000 5.421
TU membership 0.947 0.092 105.041 0.000 2.577
Salaried 0.623 0.074 69.844 0.000 1.864
Managerial duties 0.643 0.071 82.677 0.000 1.903
Married 0.572 0.065 76.610 0.000 0.861
Male 0.150 0.056 7.231 0.007 0.861
Age 0.044 0.004 148.382 0.000 1.045
Age squared 0.000 0.000 160.061 0.000 1.000
Managerial * Small firm 0.969 0.447 4.694 0.030 0.379
Professional * Small firm 1.493 0.560 7.109 0.008 4.449
Assoc. professional & technical  
* Small firm
1.475 0.493 8.935 0.003 4.370
Admin & secretarial * Small firm 1.353 0.373 13.118 0.000 3.867
Skilled trades * Small firm 0.836 0.428 3.805 0.051 2.306
Personal service occupations  
* Small firm
2.215 0.480 21.307 0.000 9.158
Sales & customer services  
* Small firm
1.144 0.729 2.460 0.117 3.139
Predicted job security 2.931 0.541 29.390 0.000 0.053
Private sector 1.426 0.071 406.325 0.000 4.163
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 3.815 0.260 216.034 0.000 45.358
Mining & manufacturing 4.021 0.245 270.204 0.000 55.770
Electricity, gas, water supply 4.044 0.258 245.518 0.000 57.067
Construction 3.243 0.203 254.649 0.000 25.607
Distribution 3.610 0.206 299.660 0.000 36.979
Financial intermediation,  
business activities
3.220 0.198 265.381 0.000 25.024
Public admin, education 3.024 0.179 285.990 0.000 20.569
Health & social services 3.303 0.192 294.664 0.000 27.188
On-the job-training &  
Medium-sized firm
0.361 0.094 14.890 0.000 0.697
On-the-job-training &  
large firm
0.854 0.098 76.436 0.000 0.426
Constant 6.506 0.255 650.662 0.000 0.001
Diagnostic Statistics 2 Log  
likelihood
Cox & Snell  
R Square
Nagelkerke  
R Square
10387.571 0.251 .406
Wald (on instruments) Chi-square 
(3) = 11.240
P value  
= 0.015
Hausman-Wu (on instruments) Chi-square 
(3) = 12.302
P value  
= 0.020
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correspondence with TCE predictions. According to Williamson’s approach, we may have 
expected greater significance with ‘professional’, ‘managerial’ and ‘skilled trades’ than the 
other occupational category variables. However, as Table 3 demonstrates, this pattern was 
not observed. Indeed, the ‘managerial’ category was significantly inversely related to ten-
ure. Whilst the foregoing is, in our view, not consistent with Williamson’s analysis, we do 
not wish to over-emphasise this given the level of aggregation involved in these variables. 
In other words, these occupational variables may capture a host of occupations with vary-
ing degrees of firm specificities.
Industry effects are positive and significant with the largest effect on tenure being in 
‘electricity, gas and water’, ‘mining and manufacturing’ and ‘agriculture, forestry and 
fishing’ with statistically similar coefficients. ‘Construction’, ‘health and social services’ 
and ‘financial intermediation and business activities’ share broadly the same level of 
significance. Again, these patterns are not consistent with TCE.
As a proxy for experience, age has the anticipated sign, a priori. Being older increases 
tenure. Surprisingly, predicted job security has a negative effect on tenure. We can only 
speculate that this may reflect periodic bouts of optimism in terms of occupational 
mobility. It does not, in our view, correspond to Williamson’s framework and may have 
greater resonance with an industry-specificity analysis. However, we emphasise that 
this is a fairly speculative interpretation.
The process of verification of the robustness of the instruments and the empiri-
cal model involved two procedures. First, a Wald test of whether the instruments are 
jointly equal to zero is performed. The general objective is to test the validity of a set of 
g independent restrictions, expressed as:
 H hθ =  (3)
where θ is a (m × 1) vector of parameters.
The Wald test statistic is:
 W H h HI H H h= − ′ ′ −− −( ) [ ( ) ] ( )  θ θ θ1 1  (4)
This is approximately a chi-square distribution with g degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis expressed in equation (3). This is followed secondly by an exogeneity 
test (Hausman-Wu) assessing independence of the instruments from the disturbance 
term. Results are compared against critical values from a chi-square distribution. 
Results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the null of no significance in the Wald test can be 
rejected. The instruments are also uncorrelated with the error term in the regression 
model; the model is statistically significant and robust.
4. Conclusions
Although the model generates statistically robust results, caution must obviously be 
exercised in making informed judgements of the evidence. As noted, this is especially 
the case in seeking to analyse Williamson’s explanation of the division of labour, which 
is subject to conceptual ambiguities as well as measurability issues. Nonetheless, we 
believe that the analysis here augments and complements firm and industry based 
empirical studies, and the analyses articulated by the likes of Fleetwood (2011) and 
Spencer (2000, 2009, 2011) (see also David and Han, 2004; Carter and Hodgson, 
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2006), as well as subjecting Williamson’s division of labour framework to direct empir-
ical scrutiny—something that is seldom attempted.
Williamson makes a host of efficiency-based predictions based on his rubric of firm-
specific labour. His approach also marginalises conceptions of power; it is reduced to 
a property of his notion of opportunism and hence becomes an issue of transaction 
cost efficiency. Arguably, Williamson enters this highly contested arena as if his analysis 
were boldly objective. It clearly is not—it privileges a type of analytical approach that 
seeks to conflate labour with exchanges for intermediate goods.
The results appear to demonstrate limited support for some of Williamson’s predic-
tions—not least the impact of trade union membership and tenure, and the association 
of tenure with relatively stable employment arrangements in that there is evidence of 
what Williamson would call ‘protective governance arrangements’, such as the pro-
vision of pensions. There is also an association with managerial duties and employ-
ment stability. Nonetheless, causation is not necessarily always linear, and feedback 
effects cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, such results are relatively uncontroversial 
and have been found elsewhere. Of greater significance is the lack of support of—and 
indeed, direct challenge to—key aspects of Williamson’s analysis. Most prominently 
the relationships between on-the-job training and tenure are contrary to the logic of 
Williamson’s transaction cost analysis. The findings on education are less obvious and 
more challenging to interpret, but they may be consistent with employment security 
and occupational mobility and may tentatively suggest some correspondence with 
Jacoby’s (1990) allusions to industry specificity. Also of some significance are the find-
ings for the relationships between firm size and tenure and perceptions of job security. 
Williamson’s framework says nothing about the size of the firm—the matrix is claimed 
to be ubiquitous. This finding alone calls for further investigation to explain this pat-
tern. Moreover, in both regressions, industry variables appear inconsistent with his 
TCE explanation, although, as noted, there is a caveat to those results and they should 
be treated with caution.
Overall, we do not find compelling evidence to support Williamson’s explanation 
for the division of labour in a developed capitalist economy, and therefore we caution 
against the appeal of Williamson’s explanation of, and blueprint for, the ‘efficient organi-
sation’ of labour. Indeed, the conflation of the employment relation with ‘intermediate 
transactions’ for any commodity, in Williamson’s analysis, raises concerns that appear 
to be borne out in this study. Williamson also appears to offer the prospect of a mis-
guided emphasis on labour specificity at the level of the organisation. By contrast, our 
approach suggests more supportive evidence for specialisation at the industry level. This, 
we believe, is a more appropriate platform in analysing the influences on the patterns of 
the division of labour.
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